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Non-Technical Summary 
The automobile industry is one of the most innovative sectors in the economy and has 
become also very competitive in spite of its oligopolistic market structure. Besides, the triad 
traditional automotive markets (Japan, USA, and Western Europe) are very satiated markets. 
Thus, there should be some market power enjoyed by the automobile manufacturers to be able 
to pay for costly (and often risky) innovations and new products introductions. 
This paper concentrates on studying the introduction of new products in the automobile 
industry, in particular, on the measurement of the private returns to innovations for 
automobile manufacturers. The focus is on the two sources of market power that may allow 
the firms to get higher profits (and, thus, recoup investments): new products and brand-name 
reputation. On the one hand, margins can be secured temporarily through the launch of new 
products and the creation of new market niches due to less pricing pressure. This can yield 
profits to the innovators and allow them to recoup their investments, and may also bring gains 
to the consumers. On the other hand, the margins can be secured rather permanently through 
the establishment of strong brands. This generates larger cash flows, which leads to more 
investment being undertaken by the premium and luxury car manufacturers.  
The objective of this paper is thus to look whether there is a reward for innovation in the 
automobile market. The incentives to innovate are studied for the German automobile market, 
which is characterized by a high degree of new product introductions to boost sales and a 
large role of brand-name reputation, being also a lead market for many innovations. The 
results of the study show a new model and brand-name reputation appear to allow the 
innovative firms to get some market power and recoup their investments. New products 
however do not constitute a separate market niche but compete with old models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Automobilindustrie ist einer der innovativsten Wirtschaftszweige und zeichnet sich trotz 
seiner oligopolistischen Marktstruktur [in jüngster Zeit] durch hohe Wettbewerbsintensität 
aus. Da die traditionellen Triadeautomobilmärkte (Japan, USA und Westeuropa) gesättigte 
Märkte sind, sollten die Automobilhersteller gewisse Marktmacht aufweisen, um teuere und 
risikobehaftete Innovationen und Neuprodukteinführungen zu finanzieren. 
Der Fokus dieses Beitrags ist die Untersuchung von Produkteinführungen in der 
Automobilindustrie, und insbesondere die Schätzung von Erträgen aus Innovationen. Zwei 
Ursachen von Marktmacht, die den Unternehmen höhere Gewinne (und damit einen 
Ausgleich der Investitionen) erlauben, werden untersucht: erstens neue Produkte und zweitens 
Markenreputation (‚brand-name reputation’). Einerseits können die Einführung neuer 
Produkte und die Schöpfung neuer Marktnischen die Gewinnmargen vorübergehend aufgrund 
eines geringeren Preisdrucks sichern. Dies führt zu erhöhten Gewinnen der Investoren bzw. 
Innovatoren, hat aber auch u.U. Vorteile für den Konsumenten. Andererseits können die 
Margen eher dauerhaft durch die Etablierung starker Marken gesichert werden. Das generiert 
höhere Cash-Flows und kann zu höheren Investitionen seitens der Premium- und Luxus-
Automobilherstellern führen. 
Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob Innovationsinvestitionen auf den Automobilmärkten 
lohnenswert sind. Untersucht werden vor allem Innovationsanreize auf dem deutschen 
Automobilmarkt, der ein LEAD-Markt für viele Innovationen ist. Dieser Markt ist 
charakterisiert durch den hohen Grad von Neuprodukteinführungen, um die hohen 
Umsatzsteigerungen zu generieren, und durch die große Rolle der Markenreputation. Die 
Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigen, dass ein neues Modell und die Markenreputation den 
innovativen Unternehmen erlauben können, eine gewisse Marktmacht zu erlangen und ihre 
Investitionen zu amortisieren. Dabei stellen die neuen Produkte keine separate Marktnische 
dar, sondern stehen im Wettbewerb mit den alten Modellen.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been a growing stream of literature, devoted to the introduction of new goods. The 
major developments directions in this literature are the historical treatment of new goods and 
their diffusion over time, measurement of recent and on-going innovations, in particular, 
quantifying social and/or private returns to innovation, and adjustment for quality changes in 
the official price indices (Bresnahan and Gordon, 1997). Product innovation has been defined 
as the introduction of goods new to the market, or with improved quality of the existing 
products (Trajtenberg, 1989). 
Private returns from investment and consumer benefits from new goods can be evaluated. A 
number of papers concentrates on the measurement of the social welfare from the introduction 
of new products, or quantification of the economic value of innovation (e.g., Trajtenberg, 
1989 (for computed tomography scanners), Hausman, 1994 (for a new brand of cereal), 
Hausman, 1997 (for cellular phones), Hausman et al., 1997 (for new services in 
telecommunications), Bresnahan et al., 1997 (for personal computers), Petrin, 2002 (for 
automobiles), Goolsbee and Petrin, 2002 (for direct broadcast satellites), Hausman and 
Leonard, 2002 (for tissue paper), Cleanthous, 2004 (for pharmaceuticals), Gentzkow, 2005 
(for online news)). The new products allow the firms to enjoy some transitory market power, 
which allows them to pay for innovation (Arrow, 1962). 
Competition behavior and private incentives to innovate (also role of a brand name) are 
explicitly addressed in a few empirical papers (e.g., Stern, 1996, Bresnahan et al., 1997). 
Stern (1996) finds the pioneer (branded) products to be closer substitutes with each other and 
to be substantially differentiated from generic products. Bresnahan et al. (1997) find that 
moving forward a technological frontier and relying on a brand-name reputation allowed 
innovative PC firms to get transitory market power. They argue that the new products can be 
protected from competition as they cannot be perfectly substituted with the existing goods 
because of some novel features, or they may be cheaper to produce. Product segmentation due 
to a brand name is another source of innovative rents to the innovators. The role of brand-
name reputation as a premium for high quality has been addressed in a number of theoretical 
papers (e.g., Shapiro, 1982, Wernerfelt, 1988). It has been found that consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for high-quality products, and the protective umbrella of a brand can be 
extended over the other products of a firm. 
Hedonic prices indexes literature (e.g., Pakes, 2002) addresses a problem of new goods in 
the price indexes and defends the use of such indexes as compared to alternative price 
indexes. 
Automobile industry appears to be interesting to study different aspects of the economics of 
innovation. The industry is highly innovative and competitive (with a lot of product and 
process innovations, product variation and proliferation). Simultaneously, there are high 
development costs, and reduced model cycles due to increased competition put additional 
pressure on the automobile producers. The introduction of new, differentiated from existing 
products, models and creation of new market niches may give the automotive firms some 
transitory market power. This can yield profits to the innovators and allow them to recoup 
their investments, and may also bring gains to the consumers. 
On the other hand, brand differentiation is a good strategy against price competition. 
Pricing pressure in the premium and luxury car market with more differentiated products may 
be rather moderate as compared to the volume-end car segment, and higher profit margins can 
be obtained. Competition may rather concentrate on brand and product attributes and 
innovations, consequently, there is more competition in quality. Through the establishment of 
strong brands, the margins can be secured rather permanently. In addition, the protective 
umbrella of a premium brand may be extended over the new products of a premium car 
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producer. This generates larger cash flows, which leads to more investment being undertaken 
by the premium and luxury car manufacturers. This, in turn, allows them to become the 
creators of competence and technology. 
To sum up, there could be two major sources of market power, which may allow the 
automotive firms to recoup their investments: through building brand-name reputation and the 
establishment of strong brands, which is rather permanent, and through the introduction of 
new products and the creation of new market niches, which is rather temporary2. 
Automobile industry literature seems to be not so rich in terms of studies about the effects 
of the introduction of new products, or rents from innovative investment. However, there is a 
number of studies, which construct hedonic price indices for the automobile industry (e.g., 
Court, 1939, Griliches, 1961, Ohta and Griliches, 1983). The studies that look explicitly at the 
economic effects of new products introduction in the US automobile industry are the ones by 
Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004). 
Petrin (2002) assesses the economic effects of the minivan introduction (Dodge Caravan by 
Chrysler). He measures the change in the consumer welfare as well as changes in the producer 
surplus through evaluating the extent of the first-mover advantage and profit cannibalization 
by innovator (his profits were found to be higher than development costs) and imitators (their 
variable profits were falling each year). Potential demand for new products and the impact on 
the market shares of the existing products has been evaluated by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
(2004). The authors study this effect on the example of the introduction of new ‘high-end’ 
SUVs. In another prediction exercise they look at the effects of the close-down of the GM 
Oldsmobile division in 2000 and find the car models that have most benefitted from this 
closure. In general, in automobile industry studies it has been found that higher quality cars 
appear to have higher margins (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995). 
The purpose of this research paper has been to look whether it pays off to produce new 
models, i.e., whether there are mark-ups on new car models specifications, which would allow 
the firms to cover the product development costs and provide enough incentives to develop 
new products, and to investigate the role of the brand-name reputation in the ability of the 
firm to get market power and recoup its investments. In addition, I have intended to study 
whether the competition is localized within volume or premium market segments (new vs. old 
classes). The two mentioned above sources of market power may be quite interlinked, which 
leads me to the empirical investigation whether both new model and brand-name reputation 
contribute to the higher market power (as compared e.g., to the introduction of new products 
by volume manufacturers). That is, I have aimed to study the (simultaneous) impact of a new 
model (innovation) and brand name (reputation) on the ability of the innovative firms to get 
market power (i.e., whether the protective umbrella of a brand-name reputation can be 
extended over new products, or continuous innovation creates brand-name reputation). 
The questions are investigated on the basis of the aggregate product-level data for the 
German automobile market in 2003. This paper rather concentrates on the measurement of the 
private benefits, as compared to the assessment of the general welfare effects, due to the 
introduction of new car model specifications (which differ in innovation value), and 
investigates this linkage to the role of brand-name reputation to get market power, which has 
not been addressed in the previous automotive industry studies. The importance of the 
principles of differentiation such as market segment and new vs. old model for the automobile 
markets is also addressed in this study. 
                                                 
2  Intellectual property rights protection could be another mechanism to enjoy some rent before the 
innovators catch up (as it has been in particular mentioned by Bresnahan et al., 1997). This aspect is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
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New products in this paper are viewed as rather those new car model specifications that fill 
in the product space (product characteristics) and products new to the firm (i.e., completely 
new products). Thus, another major difference to the other papers is that my research focus is 
not on drastic, but rather incremental innovations, or changes in the products’ 
features/products’ quality. The advantage of the data for the German car market that I use in 
this research is that one can study highly differentiated products at really a very disaggregate 
level, so that all the product variety could be really captured.3 It should be also noted that in 
general in other industries a lot of products are introduced into the market, which are not 
completely new products, but rather the existing products with added new or improved 
features. This also involves research and development costs, therefore, it would be interesting 
to see whether this strategy pays off. The continuation of the old model with new 
specifications is an alternative to the introduction of a completely new model, concerning 
which the firms should make strategic decisions.4 
The German car market is characterized by a high degree of new product introductions, a 
large role of brand-name reputation and consumer loyalty, and presence of important 
domestic premium and volume car manufacturers. It is also a lead market for many 
innovations. All this makes it together to be suitable and interesting to study the above stated 
research questions. 
The incentives to innovate are studied within the context of a discrete choice model. The 
structural oligopoly model for differentiated products is estimated on the basis of the market-
level data on prices, quantities, and product characteristics. It has been found that both brand-
name reputation and a new model have positive impact on the market shares of firms. 
Consumers are rather heterogeneous within a market segment, however, there are more 
correlated preferences for the cars of the same market segment than for the cars of different 
market segments. New products do not constitute a separate market niche, they compete with 
old products. However, there exists some differentiation between new and old car model 
specifications, which may allow the firms to enjoy some market power due to the new 
products introduction. It has been also found that consumer preferences towards brand and 
new cars vary depending on their age. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I discuss competition, innovation, and 
brand-name reputation in the automobile markets, finishing with the discussion of new 
product development in the German car market. After that empirical structural framework, 
estimation procedure and ways to address the research objectives of this paper are discussed, 
followed by the descriptive statistics for the whole data sample and for the new models. The 
paper concludes with the presentation of the empirical findings and discussion of the results. 
2. Competition and new products introduction in the automobile 
markets 
Increased global competition in the automobile markets has put pressure on the global 
automotive players to direct their efforts to build up reputation and pursue R&D activities to 
maintain, or increase their market shares. The competition and innovation trends, role of 
                                                 
3  The car model variant is the major item of competition in the automobile markets at present. Firms 
compete in rather standardized product lines (models and their variants) and not on individual car sales 
(Kaiser and Sofka, 2006). 
4  The literature that deals with modelling of the entry and exit in the differentiated products industries 
should be mentioned. The firms, both incumbents and entrants, face several decisions concerning the 
placement of their products in the market. In general, the firm can place its products close to its existing 
products, known as 'cannibalization' (e.g., Schmalensee, 1978, Eaton and Lipsey, 1979), or it can preempt 
the entire market (e.g., Spence, 1976, Brander and Eaton, 1984, Bonnano, 1987). 
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brand-name reputation, and new product development in the German automobile industry are 
discussed in the next subsections. 
2.1. Competition and innovation developments 
Recently price competition has been growing in virtually each car market segment. It has 
become especially fierce in the volume car segment, where product differentiation has faded 
away, and the products offered are rather similar and commoditised. In this case, the price 
becomes a major factor behind the purchasing decision of a consumer. The volume producers 
pursue cost-price leadership strategies to increase the market shares and profits. Competition 
may have increased among premium producers as well, especially, under the weakening role 
of brand-name reputation and quality problems by the premium car producers. 
As a general trend, there has been increasing competition for the premium producers from 
the volume manufacturers attracted by higher profit margins. On the other hand, some 
premium brand producers move to the lower-end car market (e.g., Mini and BMW 1er by 
BMW, Smart by DaimlerChrysler), establishing premium niches in the entry segments in 
order to capture customers already at the time of entering the car market for the first time. 
Competition between premium and volume cars (in the same market segment) may intensify 
when consumer demand stagnates. Another important trend is rising competition for 
European luxury brands from Asian ones. Japanese competitors are gaining, in particular, 
reputation for building reliable cars. 
More fierce competition in the automobile markets has put pressure on the OEMs to look 
through their competitive strategies. The automobile industry is characterized by the 
continuous product development and the introduction of new products into the market 
(completely new models, models with new and improved features and designs). There has 
been more electronics being put into the car, more safety innovations, improvements in 
steering and breaking systems, more innovations in the sphere of comfort and convenience, 
more environmentally driven innovations and innovative materials. 
The OEMs can respond to the competitive pressures by going to new market segments or 
niches, which may help to maintain or increase market shares and earn considerable returns. 
They may add new functional features to their vehicles to differentiate their products. This 
differentiating advantage can however rather rapidly disappear as the other firms can do the 
same rather fast. Thus, the competitive advantage can be only incremental but not sustainable 
if the innovation is easy to copy. Furthermore, the car producers may increase the quality of 
their cars but other global competitors may respond also rather quickly to this. New models, 
new product segments and niches can offer better pricing resistance. Furthermore, the new 
models can be generally cheaper produced than the previous generation after the adjustment 
for content differences (because of learning curve effect, efficiency gains in the production 
process, etc.). The strategy of new products segments and niches is not so easy to implement 
as many key automobile players are present in almost all existing niches and first-mover 
advantages may dissipate rather quickly. These developments sharpen market fragmentation 
further. Higher competition results in the shorter product life of many products. 
The above mentioned product innovations are accompanied by process innovations, 
namely, the introduction of labour-saving, capital-saving, and input-saving techniques. This 
can allow generating economies of scale and scope, which may help to cover high investment 
costs for model development and considerable fixed costs in the industry. Platform strategies 
have been pursued by the automotive players. 
The process of constant product and process innovations involves high product 
development costs. For example, the joint development of Toyota Aygo, Citroen C1 and 
Peugeot 107 has cost EUR 1.3 bn of investments (Sofka and Zimmermann, 2005). 
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To sum up, the car manufacturers compete not only in price but new products development 
for maximum profits. The results are the proliferation of new products and the growing 
fragmentation of markets (customers are increasingly demanding and differentiated, with 
preferences towards a broad variety of models and variants). Simultaneously, the product 
innovations can be relatively easily adopted by the other car manufacturers, that is why, they 
cannot be viewed as a permanent answer to the new competitive challenges. Here, the 
development of a brand name can become an important factor of rather permanent market 
power.  
2.2. Brand-name reputation and premium brands 
It has been argued that largely the premium and luxury car market introduces new 
technologies. Usually the competitive advantage from a single functional feature is rather 
short-lived, as it may be rather quickly adopted by the volume segment of the market. The 
rivals’ technologies and new products features are quickly followed in this market segment. 
The strategy of continuous technological improvement is being pursued by some OEMs 
such as Mercedes, which allowed them to create a leading edge brand image. European car 
manufacturers are argued to have a competitive edge because they can differentiate by model, 
in addition to brand identity (McKinsey Global Institute, 2005). The premium OEMs 
differentiate also in style, as it is important not to have scaled-down or upscaled versions of 
each other. The luxury producers may rather concentrate on the consistency of the model 
designs over time, which helps them to build consumer loyalty (Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). 
The addition of new features may not make the consumers switch to competing models. Thus, 
there will be less intrasegment competition as compared to the volume segment. Because of 
the consumer loyalty, the OEMs, both premium and volume, try to capture the customers 
already in the entry-level car market segments. 
Premium brand customers exhibit higher brand loyalty and consumer inertia, which may 
alleviate the competition pressure, reduce marketing costs and, consequently, lead to the 
higher profit margins by the premium brand producers than by the volume manufacturers. 
As a result of the above described developments, there appears to be a shift in the 
traditional pattern of the European automobile demand, the so-called “loss of the middle” 
(Dudenhoeffer, 2006). The traditionally strong middle car market segment appears to be less 
important, while the OEMs’ success appears to be to a large extent determined in the 
premium and entry market segments. The automobile manufacturers in the traditional middle 
car market segment such as Ford, Opel or VW lose their market shares, while the premium 
segment producers such as BMW or Mercedes, or producers in the entry market segment such 
as Toyota, Peugeot, Renault or Hyundai win market shares. As a result, brand differentiation 
seems to be even more important as it is difficult to reduce the gap between the entry and 
premium market segments. 
As for brand consumer loyalty, there have been some surveys done (e.g., Dralle, 2006). 
Audi has the highest share of loyal customers (74%), followed by BMW and Mercedes 
(71%). The mentioned criteria behind the Audi’s success are clear positioning and product 
success, while BMW is argued to bind its customers through the introduction of new 
products. 
To sum up, brand strength and quality reputation could be important sources of pricing 
power, in addition to cost factors such as features, performance and design of a car. The 
OEMs try to win consumer loyalty (already in the entry-level segment) and build up long-
term relationships with their customers. 
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2.3. Product development in the German automobile market 
Generally several major terms could be distinguished while talking about product 
development in the automobile markets that have been described by Diez (2001). These are 
product innovation, model changeover and product variation, and product proliferation. 
Product innovation is defined in the automobile industry as the introduction of a completely 
new model by a producer. The value of the innovation of a new product can be measured by a 
change of technical-quality and/or formal-aesthetic features of a vehicle. Here it is possible to 
differentiate between two cases: the introduction of a new model to widen the product 
program, and the introduction of a new model to change an already existing in the market 
model (i.e., model changeover). The product development processes are very similar in both 
cases. 
For the model change-over policy there are two very much connected variables: degree of 
innovation value and duration of a model cycle. Product variation (also Relaunch) is defined 
as the change of an already existing in the market model while keeping the major construction 
features. In the automobile economics the product variation is usually characterized as face-
lifting. The role of the face-lifting is a technical and optical updating of a model. In this case 
further product development as by a model changeover is not implied. The advantage of the 
face-lifting as compared to the model change-over is that the existing in the market products 
are not sold at strongly reduced prices. The most often used measures of face-lifting are the 
introduction of a new aggregate or component (e.g., motor); change of an exterior or interior; 
widening of a model equipment (e.g., special equipment becomes standard model equipment). 
Product proliferation is defined as widening of a product program through product 
differentiation and widening of a product width. Product differentiation implies the 
classification of a model into different types depending on motor performance, mode of drive, 
build, and equipment packages. The widening of a product width means the introduction of an 
additional model. As compared to the face-lifting, the product proliferation has an innovative 
character. Three types of strategies can be distinguished: full-line-producer (both vertical and 
horizontal product differentiation), specialized producers (either vertical or horizontal product 
differentiation) and niche producers. The major risk by product differentiation are substitution 
effects between different types of a model or between different models (‘cannibalization’). 
There are costs risks: product development (type-specific R&D expenses), production (type-
specific investments are needed), sales and service. There is a risk of not achieving economies 
of scale effect. 
The German car market is characterized by a lot of new models introductions and product 
variety at different levels: model, model variant and version (see Table 1). 
Table 1:  German automobile market: levels of model disaggregation 
Category Example 
group VW Group 
brand VW 
line Passat 
model Passat Variant 
model variant/version Passat Variant 4Motion Highline 85 kw 
Source: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)) 
Each car model specification in my dataset has the year and month of introduction into the 
German car market (the detailed descriptive statistics of this dataset will follow later). Within 
 7
those models that are characterized by 2003 year of introduction several classes can be 
distinguished (see Table 2): 5 
Group 1. Entirely new models (e.g., Smart Forfour). 
Group 2. Supplemental items: existing products with some new features added (with added 
functional features, improved quality, higher performance (e.g., diesel variant, higher 
horsepower), etc.). 
Group 3. Replacement items: e.g., a new generation of a car (e.g., Lancia Ypsilon). 
Table 2: German automobile market: model policy of car manufacturers 
 No. and best-
selling models 
New (by KBA) Entirely 
new 
Supplemental Replace 
ment 
Mini (16) Renault 
Twingo 
Lancia Ypsilon 
(09/2003) 
 Smart& prabus  Lancia 
Ypsilon 
 Smart   Ka SportKa  
 VW Polo     
Small (37) VW Polo Citroen C2 
(08/2003) 
Citroen 
C2 
A2 1.4 TDI Mazda 2 
 Opel Corsa Mazda 2 (01/2003) Smart 
Forfour 
Fiat Punto 1.3 
JTD Dynamic 
 
 Ford Fiesta Smart Forfour 
(09/2003) 
   
 Skoda Fabia     
Low 
middle 
(32) VW Golf, 
Bora 
Mazda 3 (08/2003)  Megane 2.0 
Luxe Privilege 
Mazda 3 
 Opel Astra     
 Ford Focus     
Middle (38) BMW 3er Daewoo Evanda 
(02/2003) 
 320 cd Daewoo 
Evanda 
 VW Passat Mazda RX-8 
(11/2003) 
 VW Variant TDI 
Highline 
Mazda 
RX-8 
 Mercedes C-
Klasse 
    
Upper 
middle 
(23) Mercedes E-
Klasse 
Kia Opirus 
(05/2003) 
Kia 
Opirus 
Nissan 350Z  
 BMW 5er Nissan 350Z 
(10/2003) 
   
 Audi A6, S6     
Source: own classification on the basis of the Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)) data 
The value of innovation is different for all these three classes of new products. As it has 
been mentioned above, the value of the innovation can be measured by a change of technical 
                                                 
5  The classification of new models that I use is based upon the classification by Armknecht, Lane and 
Stewart (1997) in Bresnahan and Gordon (1997) who distinguish among the following cases of new 
products: 
1. Replacement items: these are new models, which are previously available items that are or soon will be 
discontinued, such as the current year’s automobile models. 
2. Supplemental items: they include newly added brands of currently available goods (e.g., cereal) and 
new ways to sell a service (e.g., airline travel). 
3. Entirely new items: these are those, which are not closely tied to any previously available item. 
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quality and/or formal-aesthetic features of a vehicle.6 The highest innovation value is by the 
entirely new items, followed by the replacement models and supplemental items. The product 
development processes are very similar in case of entirely new and replacement models. In 
my dataset the new models are mostly the so-called supplemental items (new variants and 
versions of cars, or variants/versions with added new features) (for some examples, see Table 
2 above). 
For my estimations I define all these classes as a new product group. This combined 
definition of new products seems to be suitable for investigating my research objectives. 
Many of these new car specifications capture product proliferation, which has an innovative 
character, and not just face-lifting.7 In addition, as I have mentioned before, the new products 
in this paper are viewed as rather those new car model specifications that fill in the product 
space (product characteristics) and products new to the firm (i.e., completely new products). 
My research focus is not on drastic but rather incremental innovations, or changes in the 
products’ features/products’ quality. Not so many completely new models and replacement 
items were introduced in 2003. 
3. Empirical structural framework and estimation procedure 
3.1. Empirical structural framework 
3.1.1. Demand 
Utility (McFadden’s (1978) utility specification) 
Assume that consumer i , 1,...,i n=  has utility ( , , ; )ij j j ju u x pξ θ=  from consuming product 
j , 1,...,j J= , where 0j =  is an outside good, jx  and jξ  are observed (e.g., horsepower, 
engine size) and unobserved (e.g., style, image) product characteristics, jp  is the price of 
product j , and ( , )θ α β=  are the parameters to be estimated. 
The linear version of the random indirect utility is given by: 
, 1,..., , 0,...,ij j iju i n j Jδ ε= + = =                                                                                              (1) 
where ijε  is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across consumers and 
products. 
The mean valuation for product j  common to all consumers is: 
j j j jx pδ β α ξ≡ − +                                                                                                                   (2) 
It is assumed that a consumer purchases one unit of good that brings him the highest utility. 
Therefore, consumer i  purchases one unit of product j  if and only if 
,0 ,ij iku u k J k j> ≤ ≤ ≠                                                                                                            (3) 
Consequently, the probability ijs  that the consumer i  purchases the product j  is: 
                                                 
6  Clark et al. (1987) discuss the product development in the automobile industry and argue in general: 
"New products may simply be those incorporating minor changes to the established designs (for example, 
a washing machine with an almond cabinet instead of a white one), or they may use new technology to 
create new markets (the Xerox 914 copier)". 
7  Announced for 2003 facelifts include Ford Mondeo, and Alfa Romeo 156 (Autobild, 2003). 
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where jF  are the partial derivatives of the joint cumulative distribution function F  of 
0( ,..., )i iJε ε  with respect to its j th argument. 
Different specifications of the discrete choice models for the demand side can be derived 
depending on the assumptions about the distribution of the random utility term ijε , in 
particular, simple logit, multinominal nested logit, principles of differentiation generalized 
extreme value (PD GEV8) and random coefficients models. Below I present the empirical 
framework and later discuss the results on the basis of the two-level multinominal nested logit 
(the estimations results are, however, also presented for the one-level nested logit). 
Two-level multinominal nested logit 
It is assumed that there are 1G +  exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups, 0,...,g G= , 
where 0  is an outside good. In each group there are further subgroups gH , 1,..., gh H= . 
Utility iju  of household i  for product j  in subgroup h  of group g  is given by:
9 
(1 ) (1 ) , , ,ij j j j ig g ihg hg ij gu x p j h g i jβ α ξ ε σ ε σ ε= − + + + − + − ∈ ⊂ ∀ ∀                                     (5) 
where j j j jx pδ β α ξ≡ − +  and (1 ) (1 )ij ig g ihg hg ije ε σ ε σ ε= + − + − . Variation in consumer 
tastes enters through the last term. 
The error term ije  is decomposed into an iid shock, a group-specific component and a sub-
group specific component. igε , ihε , ijε  are standard for the nested logit distributions, igε , 
(1 )ig g ihgε σ ε+ −  and (1 ) (1 )ig g ihg hg ijε σ ε σ ε+ − + −  are assumed to have an extreme value 
distribution. It is assumed that ijε  are uncorrelated across customers; for a particular 
customer, ε ’s, which belong to the same group, will be more correlated with each other than 
with the ε ’s that belong to any other group ( igε 10); and for a particular customer, ε ’s, which 
belong to the same subgroup, will be more correlated with each other than with the ε ’s that 
belong to any other subgroup ( ihgε ). That is, the products of the same sub-group or group 
share common features, for which consumers may have correlated preferences. Nesting 
parameters hgσ   and gσ  can be interpreted as random coefficients on discrete dummies for 
subgroups and groups rather than on variables that are continuously measured (e.g., 
performance or size).11 
hgσ  measures the degree of substitutability of products in a subgroup, and gσ  is the degree 
of substitutability of products in a group. The following 0 1g hgσ σ≤ < <  should hold to be 
                                                 
8  This model has been first suggested by Bresnahan et al. (1997). 
9  In the exposition below, I follow Berry (1994), Verboven (1996) and Brenkers and Verboven (2006), 
after McFadden (1978) and Ben-Akiva and Lehrman (1985). 
10  For consumer i , the variable ε  is common to all products in a group g  and has a distribution function 
that depends on gσ . Similar interpretation is for a subgroup. 
11  In my estimations I do not allow the correlation parameters to vary across groups and subgroups. 
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consistent with random utility maximization. That is, consumer preferences will be more 
correlated across all products of the same subgroup than across products of the same group 
but a different subgroup. Consequently, relatively plausible substitution patterns can be 
obtained, and localized competition between the products from the same group or subgroup 
can be allowed. 
The above mentioned assumptions upon the aggregation of choices across all consumers 
result in the well-known formulas of the nested logit model for the conditional choice 
probabilities. The mean utility for the outside good is normalized to zero, 0 0δ = . The market 
share for a car j  in subgroup h , group g  can be written down as: 
/(1 ) /(1 )
/(1 ) /(1 )
j hg hg g hg
hg hg g g
I I
j I I I
e e es
ee e
δ σ σ
σ σ
− −
− −=                                                                                                       (6) 
where hgI  , gI  and I  are called “inclusive values” , which are defined in the following way: 
/(1 )
1
(1 ) ln
hg
l hg
J
hg hg
j
I eδ σσ −
=
= − ∑  
/(1 )
1
(1 ) ln
g
hg g
H
I
g g
h
I e σσ −
=
= − ∑                                                                                                        (7) 
1
ln g
G
I
g
I e
=
= ∑  
with hgJ  being the set of cars in a subgroup h  of a group g , and gH  being the set of 
subgroups in a group g . 
Berry (1994) suggested the log-linearization of the above formula for the market share. The 
demand equation that can be taken to the estimations is specified as follows: 
( )0 / /ln( / ) ln ln( )j j j hg j hg g h g js s x p s sβ α σ σ ξ= − + + +                                                            (8) 
where js  is the share of product j  in the total market, 0s  is the share of the outside good in 
the total market, /j hgs  is the market share of product j  in subgroup h  of a group g , /h gs  is 
the share of all products in subgroup h  in a group g . 
Substitution patterns 
The two-level nested logit has the assumption that consumers tastes have an extreme value 
distribution but allows consumer tastes to be correlated (in a restrictive way) across product j  
(correlations between groups and subgroups are modelled in a simple way). This allows for 
more reasonable substitution patterns as compared to a simple logit. Nevertheless, as 
compared to the more general random coefficients model, the correlation patterns depend on 
the groupings of products, which are determined prior to the estimation. They do not depend 
on the values of continuous variables. The group dummy variables could be viewed at least as 
a partial proxy for the omitted continuous variables (e.g., the cars from the same group are 
likely to have similar performance, size, and other characteristics) (Nevo, 2000). 
The own price elasticity /j js pE  of the market share js  of product j  is: 
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/ / /
1 1 1
1 1 1 1j j
j j g
s p j j hg j g j
j j hg hg g g
s p
E p s s s
p s
σα σ σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂= = − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ − − − −⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                           (9) 
The cross-price elasticity /j ms pE  of the market share of product j  with respect to the price 
of product m  mp , when j  and m  belong to the same subgroup, is given by: 
/ / /
1 1
1 1 1j m
j gm
s p m m hg m g m
m j hg g g
s pE p s s s
p s
σα σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂= = − + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ − − −⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                                       (10) 
The cross-price elasticity /j ks pE  of the market share of product j  with respect to the price 
of product k  kp , when k  belongs to a different subgroup in the same group, is given by: 
/ /1j k
j gk
s p k k g k
k j g
s pE p s s
p s
σα σ
⎡ ⎤∂= = +⎢ ⎥∂ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                                 (11) 
The cross-price elasticity /j ls pE  of the market share of product j  with respect to the price 
of product l  lp , when l  belongs to a different group, is given by: 
/j l
j l
s p l l
l j
s pE p s
p s
α∂= =∂                                                                                                             (12) 
Introducing consumer heterogeneity (age differentiation) 
As it has been mentioned above, the two-level nested logit still results in rather restricted 
substitution patterns. Some consumer heterogeneity could be introduced into the model 
through interacting product characteristics with consumer characteristics, e.g., age in some 
flexible way. The likely constraints that age imposes on preference-based consumer car 
choices could be, therefore, exploited: a consumer has a different probability of choosing a 
specific car depending upon his age. 
Such type of estimation may allow getting more reasonable substitution patterns 
(consumers’ valuation for cars will vary across consumers of different age) without adding up 
any computational burden to the estimation procedure. The idea is to compute a purchase 
probability for an “average” consumer in each age group and sum up these probabilities to 
generate the market shares for each product j . The total market size will be the population of 
this age in the country in a given year. 
The above demand equation (8) is, thus, estimated for each age group: 
0 / /ln( / ) ln( ) ln( )
a a a a
j j i i j ihg j hg ig h g ijs s x p s sβ α σ σ ξ= − + + +                                                         (13) 
where ia  stands for a respective age group, 
a
js  is the share of product j  in the total market 
for age group a , 0
as  is the share of the outside good in the total market for age group a , /
a
j hgs  
is the share of product j  in subgroup h  of group g  for age group a , /
a
h gs  is the share of all 
products in subgroup h  in group g  for age group a . Product characteristics and prices are 
the same for each age group. The coefficients iβ  and iα  will be different for each age group. 
In this case each age group has a different price sensitivity that is averaged to a mean price 
sensitivity using the age-group specific probabilities of purchase as weights. 
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3.1.2. Costs and firm behaviour 
The log-linear marginal cost function is assumed: 
ln( )j j jc w γ ω= +                                                                                                                     (14) 
where jw  and jω  are observed and unobserved product characteristics, respectively, and γ  
are the parameters to be estimated. 
Assume F  sellers of a differentiated product.12 Firm f  produces fJ  of F  total 
differentiated products. The demand for product j  is given by ( ), ;jMs p X θ , where M  is the 
market size. Let 
fJ
P  be the set of prices that the player f  sets. Product characteristics for any 
year are assumed to be exogenous. Assume that the outside good is competitively supplied. 
The firm f  chooses 
fJ
P  to maximize its profits, for given J  and jp  with fj J∈ : 
max ( ) ( )
fJ f f
f j j j jj Jp j J
p c Ms p Fπ ∈ ∈= Σ − − ∑                                                                                   (15) 
where jc  is the constant marginal cost of brand j , ( )js p  is the market share of brand j , 
being a function of all brands’ prices, and jF  is fixed cost for a product j . 
The first-order conditions for the manufacturer f ’s profit maximization problem are 
(assuming that pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices exists and that prices are strictly 
positive):13 
( )( ) ( ) 0
f
r
j r r
r J j
s ps p p c
p∈
∂+ − =∂∑                                                                                               (16) 
Let firm f  have ( )k f  products, which are indexed by 1 ( ),...,f fk fj J J= , with 11 1J =  
and ( )
F
k FJ J= . 
Define the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities fΔ  as: 
( )1
1 1
( )1
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
ff
k f
f f
f
ff
k f
f f
k f k f
s Js J
p J p J
s Js J
p J p J
⎛ ⎞∂∂⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Δ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
…
# % #
"
                                                                                         (17) 
In vector notation, the first-order conditions for J  total products simultaneously can be 
written down as: 
                                                 
12  In the exposition below I follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). 
13  Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) have shown that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in case of single-
product firms, using a rather general demand model. Anderson and de Palma (1992) have shown the 
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in case of multi-product firms using the nested logit 
demand model. 
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                                                                                        (18) 
Assume that Ω  is a non-singular matrix. Therefore, the first-order conditions can be 
expressed as: 
1p c s−= +Ω                                                                                                                            (19) 
with the marginal cost equation taking up the following form: 
1ln( )p s wγ ω−−Ω = +                                                                                                             (20) 
The term 1s−Ω  is a markup. Therefore, variable profits can be calculated on the basis of the 
estimated structural model for differentiated products.  
Within the last equation most often Bertrand-Nash behaviour with single-product firms, or 
Bertrand-Nash behaviour with multi-product firms is assumed. 
3.2. Estimation strategies for the demand- and supply-side equations 
In general, the demand and pricing equations can be estimated either separately, or jointly. 
Under the separate, or step-by-step, estimation, the demand equation is estimated first, after 
which the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities is constructed on the basis of the 
estimated demand parameters. The pricing equation is estimated in the second step after 
having substituted into it the matrix of the elasticities. The standard errors of the pricing 
equation parameters have to be corrected. There are several advantages of this two-step 
procedure, e.g., reduction in the computational burden, experimenting with different supply 
specifications without re-estimating the demand function, no impact from possible supply 
model misspecification on the demand side results (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001)14. The 
major drawback of this procedure is the loss in the efficiency of the estimated parameters. In 
this paper step-by-step estimation results are presented. 
3.3. Instruments 
Prices and market shares are endogenous, correlated with the error term jξ . The prices will be 
collinear with the product characteristics that are not observed (e.g., quality). The introduction 
of product fixed effects to control for the unobserved characteristics can lead to an 
identification problem due to the correlation between fixed effects and product characteristics. 
The detailed discussion of the choice of the efficient instruments for differentiated products 
models can be found in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The best candidates for the 
instruments in the differentiated product markets are the model characteristics, which are 
usually treated to be exogenous, based on the assumption that in the short run they cannot be 
quickly adjusted by a firm. Thus, the matrix Z  of instruments includes the product’s own 
characteristics (which decreases the number of necessary additional instruments) and other 
exogenous variables used in the estimations. 
The car’s own price and demand will be correlated with the physical characteristics of the 
other products, and depend on the degree and closeness of competition that the firms face 
with the other competitors. The distance from the nearest neighbouring product will determine 
                                                 
14  Step-by-step estimations are also performed by Nevo (2001). 
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the markup of each brand. The functions of the exogenous physical characteristics (own and 
competitors’) can be used as instruments (sums and averages). 
Bresnahan et al. (1997) suggest the following groups of instruments: principles of 
differentiation (defined on a group-specific basis), ownership (defined on a firm-specific 
basis, making use of the economics of the multiproduct pricing) and ownership with 
principles of differentiation (combination of a group-specific and a firm-specific basis). 
Another important set of instruments comes from the supply side. Supply-side intruments 
will be not related to the car demand: these are the variables that enter the cost and do not 
enter the demand equation. 
4. Measurement of private incentives to innovate: an empirical 
approach 
The previously described empirical framework allows studying the research questions in the 
following way: look at the impact of a premium brand and a new product on the market 
shares, study different principles of differentiation to make inferences about competition 
patterns (in particular, concerning new products), investigate substitution patterns and 
compare markups for new and old products. 
4.1. Principles of differentiation for the car market: new vs. old models classes 
and premium vs. volume market segments 
The car market can be characterized by different principles of differentiation. The most 
obvious one is by market segment. Another principle of differentiation such as new vs. old 
model may appear at the first sight not so obvious, but still it could be an important principle 
of differentiation, taking also into account a recent increased emphasis on the introduction of 
new models and growing model proliferation by the car manufacturers. This principle of 
differentiation will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.2. 
Two issues have to be taken into account here: the definition of a premium brand and the 
definition of a new product, or model. This will allow defining new and old car models 
classes as well as premium and volume car market segments. 
The estimation of the nested logit, or PD GEV model with the above principles of 
differentiation appears to be suitable for studying the consumer preferences within the market 
segment, however, the grouping choice matters for inference. Segment correlation coefficients 
can be interpreted in terms of products substitutability and competition patterns. 
The idea behind this approach is to see whether and to what extent the premium products 
are insulated from competition from the volume products. The same is for the new vs. old 
products, i.e., to see whether the new and old products compete with each other, or the new 
products enter a separate market niche. The answers to these questions depend on the degree 
of heterogeneity of consumers in their willingness to pay for a new and/or premium product15. 
Counterfactuals (introduction of a hypothetical new product into a particular group, or a 
model discontinuation) can be conducted to get some idea whether the products in various 
groups are protected from competition as it is reflected by the substitution parameters. 
The application of this approach will help to get some inferences about competition 
behaviour in each market segment and the interaction of competition between the market 
segments as well as allow to study the simultaneous impact of a brand-name reputation and a 
                                                 
15  This has been first suggested by Bresnahan et al. (1997) for a personal computer industry. 
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new model on market power (namely, one could expect that new and branded products will 
have the highest market power). 
4.2. Impact of a premium brand and a new product on market shares 
The coefficient on the premium brand preference can be interpreted as for whether the 
consumers prefer premium products over volume ones, whether they place greater value on 
the premium products. Similar interpretation will hold for the new model coefficient. Many 
people prefer (e.g., because of individuality, fashion, desire to have a sports car version, or a 
more powerful car) new car model specifications despite the availability of old, or existing in 
the market car model specifications. Individual brand dummies can be included into the 
demand equations to investigate the difference in the impact between premium and volume 
brands. 
This approach will help to answer whether there is a reward for innovation, and will allow 
studying the simultaneous impact of a brand-name reputation and a new model on the market 
shares (whether they help to maintain/increase market shares). 
4.3. Investigation of substitution patterns and estimation of markups for new 
and old products 
On the basis of the estimated demand parameters, the matrix of own- and cross-price 
elasticities can be constructed and markups can be calculated. 
High values of own-price elasticities could be interpreted as a sign of intense price 
competition. The cross-price elasticity is an appropriate measure of the distance between the 
two goods, a measure of how close the consumers find both goods to be substitutes. The high 
cross-price elasticities can be interpreted as consumers viewing the products to be close 
substitutes and also as a sign of intense price competition. To sum up, when the segment own- 
and cross-price elasticities are found to be large and significant, that may be interpreted as a 
sign of significant competition, or “cannibalization” between the brands within a particular 
market segment. 
One could compare the cross-price elasticities of products with respect to the cars from the 
same subgroup (e.g., the subgroup is premium vs. volume model16) within a market segment, 
with respect to the cars from a different subgroup within the same market segment, and with 
respect to the cars from different market segments. In the volume car segment, the products 
are closer substitutes, so that higher cross-price elasticities will be expected. In the premium 
car segment, the products are more differentiated, so that lower cross-price elasticities should 
be observed. The cross-price elasticities with respect to a different subgroup or market 
segment could be interpreted concerning the competition pattern in the given market segment 
(i.e., cross-price elasticities between volume and premium cars, or e.g., between small and 
medium cars (compare elasticities between any two premium (volume) cars and cross-price 
elasticities between premium and volume cars)). The cross-price elasticities for the 
premium/volume products should be higher within the subgroup as compared to the cross-
price elasticities of the premium/volume products with respect to volume/premium products 
outside of the subgroup. This could be interpreted as isolation of competition. The cross-price 
elasticities with respect to the cars from different market segments should be lower. 
Similar analysis could be done for new vs. old products. The new products may have lower 
price elasticities (within-group) as compared to the existing products (within-group) because 
                                                 
16  The examples of the nesting order in this case could be: 1) segment, premium vs. volume, or 2) segment, 
premium vs. volume, new vs. old. 
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they may face less price competition. The fact how close substitutes the new and existing 
products are will determine the consumer and producer surplus. 
The estimation of the structural model for differentiated products allows to recover the 
marginal costs. Thus, markups (and price-cost margins) for new premium and volume 
products can be estimated to see whether there is a premium for a brand, and to compare how 
they differ to the ones on the existing products. Models with similar vehicles characteristics, 
which differ mainly in the brand name, could be compared to see, whether there is a price 
premium for a brand (estimation of the rents attributable to brand name). If there are price 
differentials between new and old models, usually the question is whether the higher prices 
are caused by marginal costs, or by higher markups.17 
This method will allow quantifying a reward for innovation, studying the simultaneous 
impact of a brand-name reputation and a new model as well as helping to investigate the 
competition patterns within and across car market segments and sub-segments. 
For the investigation of the effects from the introduction of completely new models, which 
could probably be a closer approximation to the quantification of the rents from innovation 
and could provide basis for a richer analysis (including in particular the investigation of static 
and dynamic effects, also direct comparison of producer profits from new products 
introduction and product development costs), one would need to have a much longer dataset 
(including pre- and post-introduction new model period18). In this case the methodology will 
be similar to the one by Petrin (2002), which is described below. 
Petrin (2002) assesses the economic effects of the minivan introduction (Dodge Caravan by 
Chrysler). He finds that the consumer welfare was raised as well as the innovator’s profits 
increased at the expense of the other car producers who could not respond quickly to the 
minivan introduction. He estimates both the demand and cost side, after which these estimates 
are used to re-compute the equilibrium prices and quantities when the new minivan is not 
included into the choice set. The simulated and observed prices and quantities are summarized 
into the welfare. The author argues that the new products that are substantially differentiated 
from the existing products can bring large profits to the innovator and considerable gains to 
the consumer. The author finds that competition leads to the improvement of the consumer 
welfare because the firms tend to cannibalize each other’s profits when they search for new 
goods that would give them some temporary market power. 
Because the data on the cost of new product development is not available and I have got 
only one cross-section of data, I am using the described above in this Section approaches to 
answer my research questions (mainly following the approach by Bresnahan et al., 1997). 
                                                 
17  The change in the producer variable profits from a new product introduction could be calculated. 
18  To investigate the difference in the rents to innovation attributable to a brand, one could then investigate 
whether a premium car producer gets a higher return to each euro invested in innovation (development of 
a new model) than a volume car producer. One could also then study the impact of the introduced new 
models on the prices of the existing products. The estimation of the consumer welfare will also make 
sense in such a situation. 
The estimated welfare gains from new products, or services introduction vary in different papers. The 
welfare gains are likely to be small when the new products are similar to the products that are already in 
the market (e.g., different brands of cereals (Hausman, 1994)). Considerable consumer gains have been 
found by Hausman (1997) from a cellular phone introduction, Hausman et al. (1997) from the 
introduction of new services in telecommunications, by Cleanthous (2004) from pharmaceutical 
innovations in the US antidepressant market. Rather low welfare gains have been found by Goolsbee and 
Petrin (2002) from the introduction of direct broadcast satellites as an alternative to cable television. 
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5. Data description 
The dataset for the German automobile industry in 2003 has been constructed on the basis of 
two data sources: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt 
(KBA)), which collects information on new car registrations by car model, registrations 
across state, age, gender, and corporate status19, and car evaluation company Eurotax 
Schwacke, which provides information on prices and quality vehicles characteristics. These 
two datasets have been merged together. The data on registrations, prices and quality vehicles 
characteristics are very disaggregate and are at the level of model/type/variant/version. 
The dataset has been further enriched by the data on advertising expenditures, 
environmental statistics, reputation ranking, loss in value, and the number of defects. The data 
sources for these variables and a more detailed description are discussed below. These data 
are, however, mostly available for the higher levels of aggregation, not at the variant, or 
version level. 
The data on advertising expenditures is available from the publication “Der ADAC20 -
AutoMarxX im Dezember 2003” issued by the Center of Automotive Research, 
Fachhochschule Gelsenkirchen. The reputation ranking has been also taken from this 
publication21.  
The data on environmental and ecological statistics (e.g., fuel consumption in litres/100 km) 
to measure economic and ecological efficiency are provided by the ADAC and are available 
in the publication “Der ADAC EcoTest: 300 Automodelle im Umweltranking”. 
The data on defects statistics are taken from the publication by the ADAC “Die ADAC-
Pannenstatistik 2003”. The available series is the number of technical defects per 1000 
automobiles. Another source is “Der ADAC-AutoMarxX im Dezember 2003”, where the 
results of the TÜV (Technischer Überwachungs-Verein stands for Technical 
Inspection/Control Association in Germany) report are published (number of significant 
defects per 1000 vehicles), available at a brand level. 
The potential market is approximated by the number of households, which is taken from the 
German Ministry of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt). 
Given a large set of technical and other vehicles characteristics, I have faced a problem of 
what ones to include into my model specification. Finally, the choice of variables for my 
specifications has been driven by two factors: a trade-off between characteristics that 
                                                 
19  The available dataset contains the data on sales for both physical and corporate persons. Among the five 
market segments, small and lower middle car markets are the largest ones for physical buyers, while for 
corporate persons lower middle and middle car segments are the most important ones. The estimation 
results are based on the total industry sales (except for age differentiation case), not distinguishing 
between the sales for physical persons and fleet sales. The purchasing decisions could be quite different 
for physical persons and for institutional buyers. All other automobile market studies are also done for the 
total sales, so that for the better comparison of the results it seems worthwhile to proceed as it is. It should 
be, however, acknowledged that the corporate car sales may not be that important for the other car 
markets as they are for the German car market. The sensitivity of the results has been performed with 
respect to the sales for physical persons only, and no significant differences in the results have been 
found. 
20  ADAC stands for the General German Automobile Club (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club). This 
is one of the largest German transport clubs. 
21  According to this ranking, the top ten brands are Mercedes, BMW, Audi, Volkswagen, Porsche, Volvo, 
Opel, Jaguar, Renault, and Toyota. The brands with the lowest reputation are Lancia, Rover, Subaru, 
Daihatsu, and Suzuki. 
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consumers care about while purchasing a car22 and availability of the data on technical 
characteristics as well as addressing the problem of multicollinearity among the technical 
characteristics.23 
The descriptive statistics for the chosen variables can be found in Table 3. There could be 
several alternatives to represent various groups of factors behind the consumer car purchasing 
decision. The idea was to choose a variable with the least correlation with the other variables 
in the model specification, although for some variables the correlation levels remain pretty 
high. As a result, the following variables have been selected (whose descriptive statistics are 
given in the Table below): number of doors (basic characteristics), engine power (car’s 
performance), diesel dummy (economic and ecological efficiency), ABS and transmission-
slip control (safety), dummy for luxurious, e.g., wood interior decoration, navigation system, 
and leather seats (convenience/amenity, comfort, entertainment), and number of technical 
defects per 1000 automobiles (reliability). 
Table 3: German automobile market: descriptive statistics, 2003 
Variable Meaning Mean/share Std.err. Min Max 
price  25020.3 10806.4 6150 133516 
sales  1896.3 4293.7 10 50818 
kw3 Kilowatts of engine 
power 
97.2 40.0 30 368 
tuer Number of doors 4.4 0.9 2 5 
abs Dummy for ABS 0.98 0.2 0 1 
innendekor Dummy for 
decorative wood 
interior 
0.5 0.5 0 1 
navi Dummy for a 
navigation system 
0.03 0.2 0 1 
dieseldum Dummy for a diesel 
engine 
0.3 0.5 0 1 
defect Number of defects 
per 1000 vehicles 
15.0 4.5 0 26 
mediapercar Advertising 
expenditures per car 
457.0 1289.9 107.9 16525.3 
leder Dummy for leather 
seats 
0.4 0.5 0 1 
asr Dummy for 
transmission-slip 
control 
0.5 0.5 0 1 
modelyear Dummy if a model is 
introduced in 2003 
0.2 0.4 0 1 
Source: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)), Eurotax-Schwacke 
Note: descriptive statistics are given for the following market segments: mini, small, lower middle, middle, and upper middle.  
                                                 
22  The survey conducted by the German magazine Stern (Stern, 2006) has found the following purchasing 
criteria to be important: reliability, safety, price-quality relationship, driving comfort, technologically 
advanced, good customer service, fuel consumption, suitable for me, costs of maintaining a car, has a 
good reputation, dealer rebate, internal equipment, a lot of space, service network, resale value, base 
equipment, styling/outlook, ecological efficiency, speed acceleration, new model/version, financing 
possibilities, low price, free time and hobby, city wagon, convertible, driving gears. According to this 
study, about 27% of the interviewed people consider the presence of a new model or version to be an 
important purchasing criterion (compare, e.g., to 76% by a reliability criterion). 
23  The estimations results in general are very sensitive to the choice and scaling of variables. 
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The models in the dataset are distinguished by the year of introduction into the German car 
market on the basis of the Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-
Bundesamt (KBA)) data. A new model is introduced into the model specification as a dummy 
variable for a model being introduced in 2003. Some descriptive statistics for the new car 
models within different market segments can be found in Table 4.   
Table 4: German automobile market: descriptive statistics for new models by market segment, 
2003 
Variable No.obs. Mean Std.err. Min Max 
Total      
price 188 26968.9 8999.9 9500 85000 
sales 188 1966.8 3128.9 14 22639 
engine power 188 105.2 36.4 44 265 
Mini      
price 4 13592.5 3433.8 9500 17895 
sales 4 3158.8 3923.7 143 8486 
engine power 4 55 11.0 44 70 
Small      
price 29 15042.9 2205.0 11390 19900 
sales 29 2543.5 2886.2 124 11359 
engine power 29 63.6 16.6 44 120 
Lower 
middle 
     
price 31 22086.2 3838.6 16550 34800 
sales 31 1632.5 3138.8 14 13303 
engine power 31 93.5 27.7 60 177 
Middle      
price 101 30129.8 6990.6 22500 85000 
sales 101 2039.0 3363.7 15 22639 
engine power 101 115.2 30.7 66 265 
Upper 
middle 
     
price 23 37032.9 5753.4 27690 54150 
sales 23 1165.7 2024.5 38 7858 
engine power 23 138.1 32.7 96 220 
Source: Federal Bureau for Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)), Eurotax-Schwacke, own calculations 
Another important question has been how to define a premium brand. In this paper a 
premium brand including Mercedes, BMW, Audi is defined24, and all the models of these 
premium brands are grouped together to constitute the premium car market. A premium brand 
dummy variable has been constructed, which is equal to 1 if a car is from Audi, BMW, and 
Mercedes, and zero otherwise. Some examples for volume and premium brands across 
different market segments can be found in Table 5. 
                                                 
24  In general, the definition of a premium brand is rather a subjective issue. According to the survey 
conducted by the Automotive News (Automotive News Europe, 2005), the premium vehicles should 
possess the following features: some appropriate brand image, which would form the basis of premium 
pricing, about 15% transaction price markup as compared to a comparable volume brand vehicle, higher 
residual values, greater consumer loyalty, older buyers, global market presence, low volumes, and a lot of 
electronics. As for the last two points, there has been no common agreement among the experts. A 
premium brand definition will also be different for Europe and the US. 
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Table 5: German automobile market: premium vs. volume manufacturers across market 
segments 
Segment Major selling brands Market shares, % 
Mini Renault Twingo 22.8 
 Smart 18.2 
 VW Lupo 16.6 
Small VW Polo 17.7 
 Opel Corsa 11.3 
 Ford Fiesta 7.2 
 Skoda Fabia 7.2 
Low middle VW Golf, Bora 27.9 
 Opel Astra 10.7 
 Ford Focus 9.9 
Middle BMW 3er 17.9 
 VW Passat 15.9 
 Mercedes C-Class 15.2 
 Audi A4, S4 14.4 
Upper middle Mercedes E-Class 41.8 
 BMW 5er 21.3 
 Audi A6, S6 17.9 
Luxury Mercedes S-Class 26.3 
 BMW 7er 21.0 
 Audi A8, S8 18.6 
Source: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)), own calculations 
Car market segmentation that is used in this paper is the one developed by the Federal 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)). This classification is 
defined on the basis of optic, technical and market-oriented factors, which have been 
approved by the industry representatives. The market is divided into the following segments: 
mini, small, lower middle, middle, upper middle, luxury, SUVs, cabriolets (including 
roadster), vans, and utilities. This is a broad definition of a light vehicles market. 
The current analysis concentrates on the five market segments: mini, small cars, lower 
middle, middle and upper middle. There are several arguments for this decision. These car 
segments constitute the traditional car segment (with the exception of luxury and sports cars). 
They also represent about 80% of the total light vehicles sales in Germany in 2003. Second, 
luxury and sports cars may be driven by somewhat different supply and demand factors, thus, 
there could be problems with the model specifications and the choice of instruments. Third, 
most new models seem to be concentrated in the above-mentioned five segments in my 
dataset. The new models sales in these five segments make up about 74% of the total new 
light vehicles sales in Germany in 2003. 
6. Principal findings 
6.1. Estimation results of one-level nested logit (nest is market segment) 
The estimation of the one-level nested logit allows studying the impact of brand-name 
reputation and a new model on market shares as well as to obtain the estimates of the 
correlation parameters within the market segments in order to get inferences about 
competition patterns. 
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Demand estimation 
The following demand specifications have been estimated: base (Specification A), with a new 
model dummy and a premium brand dummy (Specification B), and with a new model dummy 
and brand dummies (Specification C) (see Table 6). 
Table 6: German automobile market: estimations results of one-level nested logit  
Nest is market segment 
Variable Spec.A Spec.B Spec.C 
α  -0.00004 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
gσ  0.28*** 0.32*** 0.43*** 
    
asr 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 
engine power 0.001 0.01 0.01** 
doors 0.10** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
abs 0.54** 0.47* 0.41** 
decoration -0.02 0.12 0.01 
leather seats -0.08 0.28*** 0.25*** 
navigation -0.28 0.40 0.23 
diesel 0.27** 0.38*** 0.28*** 
defect -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.003 
const -8.87*** -8.61*** -8.69 
    
new model  0.32*** 0.28*** 
premium brand  1.26***  
mercedes   1.68*** 
bmw   1.42*** 
audi   1.01*** 
jaguar   0.88** 
vw   0.55* 
honda   0.48* 
daihatsu   -0.62* 
Hansen J-statistic Chi-sq(1) p-val=0.62 Chi-sq(1) p-val=0.78 Chi-sq(4) p-val=0.37 
Source: own estimations 
Note: ***, **, * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Spec. A: without a new model and premium brand dummies. 
Spec. B: with a new model dummy and a premium brand dummy. Spec. C: with a new model dummy and brand (manufacturer) dummies. 
For brand dummies only statistically significant variables are presented. Kia is used as a reference group. 
The table shows that the parameters of most characteristics are of expected sign and 
statistically significant. Engine power, presence of transmission-slip control (ASR) and ABS 
system, the number of doors, some fancy decoration and being a diesel model positively 
impact the mean valuation of consumers, while the number of defects has negative impact. 
The engine power appears to be not always significant.25 The coefficients for specifications B 
and C appear to be quite similar in magnitudes. The price coefficient is of similar magnitude 
in all specifications.26 
                                                 
25  A similar problem has been also encountered in other studies (e.g., Verboven, 1996). 
26  Fershtman and Gandal (1998) have also found a rather lower price coefficient: 62.1 10xα −=  and 
0.70σ =  in the one-level nested logit. The low price coefficient, of a similar magnitude, has been found 
by Bresnahan et al. (1997). I have found the price coefficient of a similar magnitude in my panel data 
estimations of the one-level nested logit for the US automobile market (Leheyda, 2007). The magnitude 
may be, however, not so surprising. This is not the direct measure of the price elasticity of demand. The 
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The magnitude of the segment correlation parameter is less than 1, and, thus, it is consistent 
with random utility maximization assumption. The magnitude of the correlation coefficient 
can be interpreted as some evidence for the rather low correlation of consumer preferences, or 
low degree of substitution among the products within the segments, so that the products 
within the market segment are not perfect substitutes. This can be interpreted as rather not 
isolated competition in the market segments. However, the preferences are, still, more 
correlated for the cars of the same market segment than for the cars of different market 
segments (because 0.28-0.43 is significantly different from zero). 
The impact of the premium brand and new model on the market shares is positive and 
statistically significant in Specification B. The brand dummies for premium producers, 
Mercedes, BMW, and Audi, as well as a new model dummy are also statistically significant 
and positive in Specification C. This implies that German premium producers have a 
competitive advantage over other domestic and foreign volume producers. Besides, 
consumers value “newness”, or “fashion” of a car as indicated by the significance of the new 
model dummy coefficient. The new model variable may also capture the positive effect of a 
broader choice of products as well as improved/increased quality of the existing products. 
Based on the estimation results, Mercedes enjoys the highest market power, followed by 
BMW and Audi. This estimated ranking of premium brands seems to be consistent with the 
tastes of German customers. This ranking also reflects the reputation ranking constructed by 
the ADAC27. This may say in favour of the correctness of my model specification. The other 
statistically significant positive coefficients are for Jaguar, VW, and Honda. Jaguar and VW 
are also among the top 10 brands in Germany. There is also a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for Daihatsu. 
To sum up, brand-name reputation and new models allow the car producers to get higher 
market shares. Competition is not localized within market segments. 
Supply estimation 
The pricing and marginal cost equations can be found in Table 7. The supply side is estimated 
under three assumptions concerning the firms’ equilibrium interactions: competitive, single-
product, and multi-product. The coefficients of the attributes in the hedonic price regression 
can be interpreted as average marginal implicit prices for each attribute. ABS and a diesel 
motor contribute most to the price of a car among the technical characteristics in the 
specification. In the marginal cost equations, the higher the value of a car model 
characteristic, the larger is its impact on the marginal cost. As it can be seen, ABS and a diesel 
motor contribute most to the marginal cost of a car. In general, the technical characteristics 
contribute significantly to the prices and marginal costs. The brand dummies could be viewed 
as the relative price markup that a customer is willing to accept for the brand of his car as 
compared to what he would be willing to pay for an equally equipped reference car (in my 
estimations this is Kia). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
coefficient rather gives the constant proportional, or relative change in the market share ratio for a given 
absolute change in the value of price. The magnitude of the variables can be also connected to the scaling 
of variables. 
27  In general, there exists a number of rankings on brand loyalty and reputation. According to the ADAC 
ranking, the brands with the highest reputation are Mercedes, BMW, Audi, VW, Porsche and Volvo. The 
ranking of cars is also available from Auto Motor and Sport magazine (Auto Motor and Sport, 2006). 
According to this publication, Mercedes, BMW, Porsche and Audi have enjoyed the highest rankings in 
2003. 
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Table 7: German automobile market: pricing/marginal cost equations estimations 
Variable Competitive Single-product Multi-product 
engine power 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
doors 0.01*** 0.02* 0.02*** 
asr 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
abs 0.17*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 
decoration 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 
leather seats 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 
navigation 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 
diesel 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
mercedes 0.52*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 
mitsubishi 0.36*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
audi 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 
subaru 0.34*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 
jaguar 0.33*** 0.46*** 0.40*** 
vw 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 
bmw 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 
volvo 0.31*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 
saab 0.31*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 
honda 0.30*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 
nissan 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
renault 0.25*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
mazda 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 
mgrover 0.23*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 
fiat 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 
opel 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 
peugeot 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 
ford 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 
skoda 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
citroen 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
toyota 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 
chrysler 0.15* 0.27** 0.25*** 
seat 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
hyundai 0.13** 0.21*** 0.22*** 
suzuki 0.10* 0.16 0.17*** 
daihatsu 0.09 0.09 0.09 
daewoo -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 
smart -0.02 -0.27** -0.31*** 
const 8.80*** 7.87*** 7.79*** 
R2 0.87 0.90 0.90 
Source: own estimations 
Note: ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Kia is used as a reference group.  
6.2. Estimation results of two-level nested logit (two nests: market segment 
and new vs. old model) 
The estimation of the two-level nested logit allows me to study the impact of brand-name 
reputation and new model on the market shares as well as to obtain the estimates of the 
correlation parameters within market segments and the classes of new and old products in 
order to get inferences about competition patterns. 
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The clustering of products is used to incorporate consumer heterogeneity into the nested 
logit model. Two principles of differentiation in the automobile markets are explicitly 
incorporated in the two-level nested logit: differences among market segments28 and the 
distinction of being a new product (i.e., a car model specification is introduced into the 
German car market in 2003). Therefore, the consumer heterogeneity associated with the tastes 
for a particular market segment and the taste for a new model is explicitly parameterized in 
the model. Such a principle of differentiation as a new model seems to be quite reasonable. As 
it has been mentioned, 27% of the interviewed consumers consider being a new model to be 
an important car purchasing criterion. Another factor used by the construction of image 
rankings (e.g., the one used by ADAC29) is the fact of being a leader in the automobile 
research, or product development. 
Each car is, therefore, evaluated by consumers along three principal dimensions. The first 
dimension is a market segment (the segmentation is based upon prices, content, etc.). The cars 
from the same market segment share features such as size and prestige. Second, there are 
differences between new and old car model specifications. Many people prefer (e.g., because 
of individuality, or fashion, or desire to have a new sports car version, some additional 
features) new car model specifications despite the availability of old, or existing in the market 
car model specifications. The cars from the same subgroup share additional features, e.g., 
newness, or style. Finally, the individual demand is affected by price and technical 
characteristics. 
The results of the estimations of the two-level nested logit can be found in Table 8. As in 
case of one-level nested logit, three model specifications have been estimated: base 
(Specification A), with a new model dummy and a premium brand dummy (Specification B), 
and with a new model dummy and brand dummies (Specification C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  Instead of a premium vs. volume market segment, the market segmentation principle could be used as a 
more natural way for nests in the consumer purchasing decision. In any case, mini, small and lower 
middle car segments can be treated as volume car segments as they are dominated by volume brands, and 
middle and upper middle market segments can be viewed as premium market segments as they are 
dominated by premium brand sales. 
29  The top 10 brands in this ranking are Mercedes, BMW, Audi, VW, Porsche, Volvo, Renault, Toyota, 
Opel, and Ford. 
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Table 8: German automobile market: estimations results of two-level nested logit 
Nests are market segment and new vs. old model 
Variable Spec.A Spec.B Spec.C 
α  -0.000049* -0.00005*** -0.00007*** 
hgσ  0.34 0.33*** 0.35*** 
gσ  0.09*** 0.18 0.20* 
    
asr 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 
engine power 0.003 0.005 0.005 
doors 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
abs 0.54** 0.50** 0.36 
decoration 0.03 0.14 -0.02 
navigation -0.16 0.28 0.16 
diesel 0.27* 0.34** 0.20* 
defect -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.005 
const -8.59*** -8.81*** -9.06*** 
    
premium brand  1.10***  
mercedes   1.42*** 
bmw   1.29*** 
audi   0.88*** 
daihatsu   -0.77* 
Hansen J-statistic Chi-sq(2) P-val=0.29 Chi-sq(2) P-val=0.11 Chi-sq(2) P-val=0.13 
Source: own estimations 
Note: ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Spec. A: without a new model and premium brand 
dummies. Spec. B: with a new model dummy and a premium brand dummy. Spec. C: with a new model dummy and brand (manufacturer) 
dummies. For brand dummies (Specification C) only statistically significant variables are included. Kia is used as a reference group. 
The magnitude and ranking of the correlation parameters are consistent with random utility 
maximization assumptions. The correlation of the consumer preferences within the subgroup 
(new, or old car model specifications class) is higher that the correlation of the consumer 
preferences in the group (market segment). Competition between new cars and old cars is 
relatively weak as there is some difference between the correlation parameters hgσ  and gσ . 
Consumer preferences are more correlated for the cars of the same subgroup (0.35) than for 
the cars from the same market segment but a different subgroup (Specification C). This means 
that consumers have more homogenous valuations concerning the cars that come from the 
same subgroup (new vs. old) than for the cars just from the same market segment. Thus, there 
appears to be some additional segmentation or differentiation between new and old models. 
The preferences are more correlated for the cars of the same market segment than for the cars 
from different market segments since 0.20 is significantly different from zero (Specification 
C). Similar to the one-level nested logit results, there is some evidence for not isolated 
competition in the market segments. 
The premium brand dummy has a positive statistically significant impact on the market 
shares. Similar to the estimations results of the one-level nested logit, Mercedes, BMW and 
Audi enjoy considerable brand-name reputation power as compared to all other car 
manufacturers. 
To sum up, as in case of one-level nested logit, brand-name reputation and new model lead 
to the higher market shares. In addition, there appears to be some additional differentiation 
around new/old products, which may allow the automotive firms to get some market power to 
recoup their investments. 
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6.3. Estimation results of nested logit with age differentiation 
As I have mentioned above, I estimate age-specific nested logits for each age group. In such a 
way I interact consumer heterogeneity with product characteristics to get more flexible 
substitution patterns. Each age group has a different price sensitivity that is averaged to a 
mean price sensitivity using the age-group specific probabilities of purchase as weights. 
Taking into account age differentiation (for more discussion, see Section 3.1.1), the demand 
equation is estimated separately for each age group under three specifications similar to the 
above estimations: base (Specification A), with a premium brand and a new model dummies 
(Specification B), and with a new model dummy and brand dummies (Specification C). The 
same set of instruments is used for each age group. I differentiate between five different age 
groups: car customers aged up to 29, customers between 29 and 39, customers between 39 
and 49, customers between 49 and 59, and customers older than 60 years. The estimation 
results of the one-level nested logit with age differentiation for base specification A (without a 
new model and premium brand dummies) can be found in Table 930. 
The most important for me are the estimates of the price and correlation parameter 
coefficients that are further used in the calculation of substitution patterns and markups. The 
higher absolute values of price and segment correlation coefficients imply higher elasticities 
of substitution. Lower price sensitivity for premium products should drive down their 
elasticities. It has been found that price sensitivity coefficient, in accord with a priori 
expectations, decreases with the age of customers. Price sensitivity is the largest for the 
youngest age group. Price age sensitivity is to a great extent linked to price income sensitivity 
as there will be a positive relationship between the age of customer and his income up to a 
certain age. The preferences of customers older than 60 and young customers up to 29, are 
least correlated (0.19 and 0.27, respectively), so that the products are perceived to be the least 
substitutes by these customer groups. The lower estimated price coefficient and correlation 
parameter for the age group of people older than 60 could be attributed to especially large 
consumer heterogeneity in the old age market segment31. This large consumer heterogeneity 
could be explained by the higher incomes of older people, their higher valuation of brand, and 
their ability to afford themselves some different from others model due to e.g., the previously 
saved incomes. The lower segment correlation coefficient for the customers up to 29 may be 
also reasonable to expect: young customers, although mostly with low incomes, are likely to 
strive for individuality. The preferences are most correlated for the customers of 29-39 and 
39-49 age groups (0.33 and 0.34, respectively).  In general, the pattern of the correlation 
parameters is consistent with apriori expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30  As for the two-level nested logit estimation with age differentiation, where the two nests are the market 
segment and new vs. old model, it has been difficult to get the results, consistent with random utility 
maximization. 
31  Marketing studies show that older customers have other demand preferences towards car design and 
equipment and that they are more brand-loyal as compared to younger car customer groups (Autohaus, 
2006). The car comfort is very important for them. 
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Table 9: German automobile market: estimation results of age-specific models  
One-level nested logit: nest is market segment 
Specification A: base (without premium brand and new model dummy) 
Variables up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older than 60 
α  -0.00013*** -0.00007*** -0.00006*** -0.00005** 0.000008 
gσ  0.27*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.19** 
asr 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 
engine power 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02** 
doors -0.02 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.08* 
abs 0.44** 0.47** 0.43** 0.55*** 0.65** 
decoration -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.00 0.06 
leather seats -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
navigation -0.63*** -1.09*** -0.47** -0.41* -0.41* 
diesel 0.62*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.02 -0.69*** 
defect -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07 
media -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
const -10.43*** -9.58*** -8.92*** -9.04*** -9.98*** 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.44 
Source: own estimations  
Note: These are the GMM estimation results with robust standard errors. ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
Table 10 presents the results of the estimations for Specification B when both premium 
brand and new model dummies are included into the estimated model specification. The 
pattern of the correlation parameters and price sensitivity is similar to the one estimated on the 
basis of Specification A. 
The coefficients for a new model are the highest for 49-59 and older than 60 groups of 
customers. They are very low for the customers up to 29 years old. The young customers may 
also tend to buy used cars, the market for which is, however, not modelled in this paper. 
There is a substantial price premium paid for premium cars. Brand dummy coefficient is the 
highest for the older than 60 customers, followed by the younger customers (up to 29). The 
high premium brand coefficient for the young customers could be somewhat rather 
unexpected, but it may be attributed to high preferences towards BMW and Audi as it could 
be inferred from the high shares of those cars in the total sales of this age group. Mercedes 
cars make up a lower share in the sales of this age group as compared to the older age groups. 
But it can be seen that older car customers have strong preferences for new and premium car 
models. 
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Table 10: German automobile market: estimation results of age-specific models  
One-level nested logit: nest is market segment 
Specification B: with premium brand and new model dummies 
Variables up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older than 60 
α  -0.0002*** -0.00012*** -0.00011*** -0.00009*** -0.00005 
gσ  0.24*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.15 
      
new model 0.08 0.21** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 
premium 
brand 
1.14*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 1.05*** 1.21*** 
      
asr 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.44*** 
engine power 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
doors 0.05 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
abs 0.31 0.45* 0.34 0.43* 0.46 
decoration 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.14 
leather seats 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 
navigation -0.23 -0.95*** -0.17 -0.06 0.11 
diesel 0.70*** 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.06 -0.68*** 
defect -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 
media -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
const -10.62*** -9.71*** -9.08*** -9.16*** -10.17*** 
Adj. R2 0.45 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.41 
Source: own estimations 
Note: These are the GMM estimation results with robust standard errors. ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
The estimation results for specification C when brand dummies and a new model dummy 
are included can be found in Table 11. The expected ranking of Mercedes, BMW and Audi 
has been found as above. The highest preferences for Audi are by up to 29 customers. The car 
customers between 29 and 39 value BMW and Mercedes most among all customer groups. 
Each age group values Mercedes cars most of all.  VW is most valued by youngest car 
customers. Peugeot and Renault coefficients are both highly significant and positive for the 
youngest car customers, the same is true for Skoda and Seat. As for consumer preferences 
towards Japanese car brands, the German car customers seem not to value them as much as 
domestic brands. Nissan coefficient has been found not to be significant at all. Toyota has 
been found positively significant by 39-49 and 49-59 age customers. Only Honda has been 
found to be quite highly valued by the German car customers. Domestic and Japanese cars 
may, therefore, have different images by the German car customers. 
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Table 11: German automobile market: estimation results of age-specific models  
One-level nested logit: nest is market segment 
Specification C: with brand dummies and a new model dummy 
Variable up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older than 60 
α  -0.00021*** -0.00017*** -0.00014*** -0.00012*** -
0.000079*** 
gσ  0.35*** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.30*** 
new model 0.17* 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 
asr 0.18* 0.16* 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.35*** 
engine power 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 
doors 0.07* 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 
abs 0.33* 0.40** 0.45*** 0.44** 0.61*** 
decoration 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.11 
leather seats 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 
navigation -0.01 0.04 0.26 0.31 0.29 
diesel 0.65*** 0.48*** 0.31*** 0.16 -0.46*** 
defect -0.09*** -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06** 
media 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
const -9.40*** -9.54*** -9.19*** -9.37*** 0.49*** 
audi 1.37*** 1.26*** 0.91*** 1.00*** 0.81*** 
bmw 1.64*** 1.73*** 1.27*** 1.32*** 1.02*** 
citroen 0.92* 0.56 0.05 0.07 0.00 
daewoo -0.46 -0.47 -0.51 -0.65* -0.85* 
daihatsu -0.96** -0.64 -0.47 -0.48 -1.25*** 
mercedes 1.87*** 1.92*** 1.81*** 1.91*** 1.26*** 
chrysler -1.25* -0.70 -0.69 -1.15* -0.24 
fiat 0.77* 0.30 -0.07 -0.10 -0.43 
ford 0.64 0.41 0.20 0.31 0.24 
honda 0.76** 0.69** 0.62** 0.60* 0.30 
hyundai -0.20 -0.23 -0.26 -0.22 -0.21 
mazda 0.32 1.03* 1.28** 1.29** 0.14 
mgrover 0.26 0.60 0.64 0.63 -0.76 
mitsubishi 0.54 -0.47* -0.90*** -0.83 -0.12 
nissan 0.01 0.63 0.59 0.55 -0.25 
opel 0.73* 0.05 0.15 0.32 0.19 
peugeot 1.25*** 0.45 0.19 0.24 0.26 
renault 1.04** 0.73 0.29 0.26 0.15 
saab -0.19 0.57 0.12 0.18 -0.85*** 
seat 1.13** -0.26 -0.20 -0.01 -0.29 
skoda 1.13*** 0.10* -0.25 0.37 -0.11 
smart -1.02** 0.72 0.38 0.33 -1.65*** 
subaru -0.47 0.14 0.16 0.42 -0.35 
suzuki -0.65* -0.26 -0.09 0.10 -0.15 
toyota -0.17 0.30 0.42* 0.53** -0.29 
vw 1.23*** 0.94*** 0.59* 0.54* 0.23 
volvo 0.11 0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.52 
Adj. R2 0.60 0.62 0.68 0.67 0.61 
Source: own estimations.  
Note: These are the GMM estimation results with robust standard errors. ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
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To sum up, the qualitative conclusions concerning brand-name reputation and new products 
are similar as in case of more restricted nested logits. Some additional inferences have been 
obtained about the role of brand-name reputation and new car models for different types of 
customers depending on their age. The estimated price and correlation parameters coefficients 
are further used in the construction of the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities and 
calculation of markups, which is discussed in the next section. 
6.4. Analysis of substitution patterns and markups 
The results of the estimated own-price elasticities on the basis of the age-specific nested logits 
can be found in Table 12. They are first calculated separately for each age consumer group 
(up to 29, between 29 and 39, between 39 and 49, between 49 and 59, and older than 60) and 
then the weighted averages are calculated (the weights are determined by the share of the 
population of the given age in the total population). It has been found that the own-price 
elasticities are the lowest for the older car customers, which could be already inferred from 
the pattern of the above discussed price and correlation parameters estimates of demand. The 
youngest car customers are most price-sensitive. 
Table 12: German automobile market: comparison of own-price elasticities at market 
segment level for age groups (one-level nested logit with age differentiation) 
 up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older 
than 60 
weighted nested 
logit 
total 8.30 7.21 6.26 5.37 2.83 6.14 4.30 
new 8.94 7.78 6.75 5.79 3.05 6.62 3.94 
old 8.18 7.11 6.17 5.29 2.79 6.05 4.26 
mini 3.89 3.38 2.93 2.52 1.33 2.88 2.01 
new 4.49 3.90 3.38 2.90 1.53 3.32 2.32 
old 3.83 3.32 2.88 2.47 1.31 2.83 1.98 
small 4.92 4.28 3.72 3.19 1.68 3.65 2.55 
new 4.99 4.34 3.76 3.23 1.70 3.69 2.59 
old 4.91 4.27 3.71 3.18 1.68 3.64 2.55 
lower 
middle 
7.04 6.13 5.32 4.56 2.41 5.22 3.65 
new 7.32 6.37 5.53 4.74 2.50 5.42 3.80 
old 7.02 6.10 5.30 4.55 2.40 5.20 3.64 
middle 9.58 8.33 7.23 6.20 3.27 7.09 4.97 
new 9.99 8.69 7.54 6.47 3.41 7.40 5.18 
old 9.44 8.21 7.13 6.12 3.22 6.99 4.90 
upper 
middle 
13.35 11.61 10.08 8.65 4.56 9.89 6.92 
new 12.28 10.67 9.26 7.94 4.19 9.09 6.36 
old 13.53 11.76 10.21 8.76 4.62 10.02 7.01 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Under ‚nested logit’ the estimates of the own-price elasticities from one-level nested logit (nest is market segment) are presented.  
The average own-price elasticities for age groups go down in magnitudes for all market 
segments as one goes to the older age groups. But within the age group, one gets higher own-
price elasticities as one moves to the larger car segments. This could be, on the one hand, a 
limitation of nested logit estimation.32 On the other hand, these results might be true, e.g., one 
                                                 
32  Namely, higher prices imply higher own-price elasticities. The problem of cross-price elasticities is 
solved with respect to the car models in the other market segments, but not within the same market 
segment. The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property implies that the customers will tend 
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could expect higher elasticities in the middle car segment, which is overcrowded with 
products and where fierce competition could be expected. The alternative explanation could 
be that including consumer heterogeneity into the demand equation does not always help to 
get the substitution patterns that one would expect a priori (here individual-level data could be 
then rather preferred). It should be also mentioned that the empirical studies do not give a 
one-way answer on the magnitude of the elasticities and markups. In particular, Jaumandreu 
and Moral (2006) also find higher elasticities and markups for the larger car market segments 
on the basis of the BLP random coefficients demand estimation (following Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes, 1995). The range of their own-price elasticities ranges from 2.72 for the small cars 
to 3.84 for the cars in the luxury car segment. The range of the price-cost margins is from 
64% for the small cars to 38% for the luxury cars. Mariuzzo (2005) also finds lower price 
elasticities in the small car segments on the basis of the random coefficients model estimation, 
which he interprets as the higher market power in those market segments. 
Higher own-price elasticities for the new models than for the old models have been found in 
the mini, small, lower middle, and middle car market segments. Only in the upper middle car 
market segment the own-price elasticities for the new car models are lower than those for the 
old car models. This market segment is dominated by the premium class models. The best-
selling models in this segment are Mercedes E-Class, BMW 5er, and Audi A6/S6. Therefore, 
it could be an indication that the new and branded models are protected from competition 
from the old and volume car models; so that the competition in the new models subgroup of 
the upper middle market segment is rather limited as it could be inferred from the estimated 
elasticities. 
As compared to the own-price elasticities estimated on the basis of the restricted one-level 
nested logit, I have got somewhat higher own-price elasticities on the basis of the estimated 
age-specific nested logits. But the pattern of the own-price elasticities for the new and old car 
models has remained the same, except for the average own-price elasticities for new and old 
models in the total German car market. 
The pattern of markups for different market segments, also calculated on the basis of the 
age-specific nested logits, can be found in Table 13. The markups (under single-product 
Bertrand-Nash assumption) are calculated separately for each age group and then the 
weighted averages are calculated using the shares of the car sales of each particular age group 
in the total car market sales (for private persons only). 
The pattern of markups for new and old models varies across customer groups and across 
market segments. The markups are higher for the larger car market segments. They are higher 
for the new products in the mini and middle car market segments. The best selling cars in the 
mini car segment are Renault Twingo, Smart and VW Lupo, while in the middle class these 
are BMW 3er, VW Passat, and Mercedes C-class. The middle car segment is characterized by 
the highest number of introduced new models and new models sales in the total segment car 
sales. High competition may be expected in this market segment so that the new products 
introduction may somehow allow the firms to get some market power to recoup their 
investments, notwithstanding high competition in this market segment. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
to substitute away, say from Mercedes, to the other popular cars as measured by the market shares, and 
not to the other similar products. 
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Table 13: German automobile market: comparison of markups at market segment level for 
new and old models (one-level nested logit with age differentiation) 
 weighted 
mean 
std. err. min max nested logit 
mean 
total 5262.54 882.23 3463.50 8823.35 5817.26 
new 5226.81 893.57 3694.94 7327.63 5816.63 
old 5269.20 880.39 3463.50 8823.35 5817.23 
mini 4737.59 510.30 3795.44 5982.14 5868.52 
new 4785.62 339.22 4454.95 5256.32 5867.29 
old 4732.25 529.16 3795.44 5982.14 5868.65 
small 4892.80 622.63 3631.25 7201.16 5818.12 
new 4665.88 463.18 4023.61 5663.12 5818.09 
old 4928.18 637.68 3631.25 7201.16 5818.13 
lower middle 5215.28 949.13 3493.49 8823.35 5813.93 
new 4844.63 938.25 3694.94 7323.50 5812.85 
old 5249.79 944.13 3493.49 8823.35 5814.03 
middle 5434.46 882.99 3463.50 7988.76 5813.10 
new 5456.82 902.41 4034.45 7327.63 5814.74 
old 5427.24 877.98 3463.50 7988.76 5812.57 
upper middle 5546.23 865.46 4023.38 7795.33 5821.59 
new 5515.84 781.05 4486.07 6908.14 5819.00 
old 5551.19 880.93 4023.38 7795.33 5822.01 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Under ‚nested logit mean’ the markups calculated on the basis of the restricted one-level nested logit are presented. As compared to the 
markups calculated on the basis of the restricted one-level nested logit, there is more variety in the markups calculated on the basis of the 
age-specific nested logits. 
To sum up, it has been difficult to get a full comprehensive analysis of the pattern of the 
elasticities and mark-ups on the basis of the above estimates, which has been initially planned. 
The IIA property appears not to have been solved completely within the nests. The results 
might be improved through extending the time dimension of the dataset and introducing more 
consumer heterogeneity within random coefficients framework. The number of markets and 
other sources of identification are very important in such type of estimations. 
7. Conclusions 
The automobile industry is one of the most innovative sectors in the economy and has become 
also very competitive in spite of its oligopolistic market structure. The automobile industry is 
characterized by a lot of new products introductions and considerable product proliferation. 
Besides, the triad traditional automotive markets (Japan, USA, and Western Europe) are very 
satiated markets and are mostly driven by car replacement purchases. Thus, there should be 
some market power enjoyed by the automobile manufacturers to be able to pay for costly (and 
often risky) innovations and new products introductions. 
The major approach pursued in this paper to study the effects of new products introduction 
has been to evaluate the competition pattern in the new and old models classes and look at the 
interaction in the competition between them as well as to study the impact of new models and 
premium brand on market shares. 
I have found that in general both new products and brand-name reputation allow the 
automobile manufacturers to increase market shares. My results are similar to the results by 
Bresnahan et al. (1997), which is the closest study for the comparison of the results. It should 
be emphasized that the focus of the paper, as compared to the above and other studies, has 
been not on drastic innovations, or drastic changes in the quality of the existing products, but 
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rather on incremental ones. The methodology has allowed me to draw some implications 
whether the proliferation strategy by the automotive manufacturers pays off, and what the 
effect of additional product variety is. The approach pursued in this paper appears to be the 
most suitable one to study the role of brand-name reputation and new models in the German 
car market given the data restrictions that I have got. 
I have found that both premium brand and new products may increase demand market 
shares. This is in line with an already rather standardized fact that premium car producers are 
drivers of modern technology. This could support the fact that the two sources of market 
power may be quite interlinked in the automobile industry: continuous innovation, which is 
embodied in the introduction of new products, leads to higher brand-name reputation in the 
automobile industry, while the protective umbrella of a brand may be extended over the new 
products. Brand-name reputation is very important in the automobile industry. Brand 
differentiation may limit the intensity of competition in the automobile industry. 
When a new principle of differentiation such as new vs. old model is added to the market 
segment differentiation, there appears to be some additional market fragmentation with 
respect to new vs. old model. Competition is not isolated in the new or old models segments. 
Presence of substantial heterogeneity of consumer preferences implies that new and premium 
products can be protected from competition from old and volume products. The groups of old 
and new products coexist, neither eliminating each other. Premium brand allows the firms to 
get higher mark-ups in general and on new products. Therefore, the automotive firms might 
have enough incentives for new product development. 
Rather low correlation of consumer preferences has been found, which can be interpreted as 
a sign of rather not isolated competition between the products within the market segments. 
This may bear implications for the use of market segment definitions by industry and 
authorities representatives. Consumer tastes are quite differentiated. The product space is 
quite overcrowded with different models. Products overcrowdedness may contribute to the 
higher products rivalry and lower rents than otherwise obtained. The firms may cannibalize 
each other’s profits by introducing a lot of similar products. To study this issue more 
profoundly, the estimation of more reliable substitution patterns could be worthwhile. The 
analysis of own- and cross-price elasticities has been somewhat limited in this paper. 
To sum up, a new model and brand-name reputation may allow the innovative firms to get 
some market power and recoup their investments, so that there is some reward for a new 
model specification. Competition is, however, not localized within a market segment and the 
class of new, or old models, i.e., consumers are rather heterogeneous based on these principles 
of differentiation. 
The differentiated products demand in this paper has been derived from the discrete choice 
framework. The use of the multinominal nested logit model in this paper, except for its 
computational tractability, can be justified by the dependence of the substitution effects 
between the cars on the predetermined classes of products in the automobile industry as well 
as an attractive way to address the posed issues within this research project. 
Some consumer heterogeneity has been introduced into the model through incorporating 
consumer age differentiation that allows for more flexible substitution patterns without adding 
up any computational burden (I use the information on sales for different age groups and 
federal territories in Germany for this purpose). The estimation of age-specific nested logits 
has allowed me to study the demand for cars across age groups and differentiate between the 
impact of a premium brand and a new model on different types of customers. Youngest and 
oldest car customers appear to care most about a premium brand. Older car customers have 
been found to have strongest preferences for new and premium products. 
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Product characteristics are treated to be exogenous in this model. The questions are 
addressed within a static framework. The discounted value of rents in each period will 
determine the private incentives to innovate. The measurement of transitory market power in 
each period can contribute to understanding innovative investment in dynamic markets 
(Bresnahan et al., 1997). The decision where a firm should put a car in the product space is 
not modelled in this paper. However, the static models could be estimated for separate years 
and could be viewed as a proxy for optimal dynamic decisions. New goods introduction and 
termination of old models should be viewed as a joint decision. Simulations could be 
performed in the future for all models in 2003 dataset and all models in 2003 dataset plus 
models that have been terminated in the previous years if the data become available. The 
change in producer variable profits could be then investigated in an intertemporal context. 
This could allow getting better approximation of the rents from innovative investment. 
Usually empirical studies find low general welfare effects, in particular effects on the 
consumer welfare, when the new products do not differ significantly from the existing 
products. The evaluation of the consumer welfare (whether the new models lead to the 
improvements in the consumers’ standard of living) could be, however, a possible research 
extension of this paper to verify the findings of the previous studies. 
A new product introduction, especially the introduction of a product very different in 
quality from the existing products may have dynamic effects, e.g., it may evolve the creation 
of a whole new market segment (involving subsequent ‘me-too’ introductions). The car 
manufacturers may imitate/follow each other in the introduction of models (e.g., by size, or 
characteristics). As I have got only one cross-section of data, this in the first turn has 
prevented me from studying these effects. Petrin (2002) has studied the effects of new models 
introduction for the US car market on the basis of the static models (minivan introduction, 
evaluating innovators’ and imitators’’ payoffs). The author estimated that the profits from the 
minivan introduction exceeded the reported costs of its development by far. The effects of the 
similar or other “me-too” strategies could be evaluated in the future studies on the basis of 
entry and profitability models for the car industry. This research paper has been rather limited 
in terms of the data available to study such effects. 
8. References 
Arrow, K. J. (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in: 
Nelson, R. (Eds.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. 
Autobild (2003), Die Zukunft der Mittelklasse: Starke Mitte, www.autobild.de. 
Auto Motor and Sport (2006), Die Besten Autos/Best Cars 2006. 
Autohaus (2006), Alt Kauft Neu, www.autohaus.de. 
Ben-Akiva, M. and S. R. Lehrman (1985), Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application 
to Travel Demand, The MIT Press. 
Berry, S. (1994), Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation, RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, 242-262. 
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn and A. Pakes (1995), Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 
Econometrica, 63(4), 841-890. 
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn and A. Pakes (2004), Differentiated Products Demand Systems from a 
Combination of Micro and Macro Data: The New Car Market, Journal of Political Economy, 
112(1). 
Brenkers, R. and F. Verboven (2006), Liberalizing a Distribution System: the European Car 
Market, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 4, No. 1, 216-251. 
 35
Bresnahan, T. F., S. Stern and M. Trajtenberg (1997), Market Segmentation and the Sources 
of Rents from Innovation: Personal Computers in the Late 1980s, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 28(0), Special Issue in Honor of Richard E. Quandt, S17-S44. 
Bresnahan, T. F. and R. J. Gordon (1997), The Economics of New Goods, Studies in Income 
and Wealth, Volume 58, NBER, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, University 
of Chicago Press. 
Clark, K. B., W. B. Chew, T. Fujimoto, J. Meyer, F.M. Scherer (1987), Product Development 
in the World Auto Industry, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1987, No. 3, 
Special Issue on Microeconomics, 729-781. 
Cleanthous, P. (2004), Evaluating Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Mimeo, New 
York University. 
Court, A. T. (1939), Hedonic Price Indexes with Automotive Examples, in: The Dynamics of 
Automobile Demand, General Motors Corporation, New York, 99-117.  
Diez, W. (2001), Automobilmarketing: Erfolgreiche Strategien, Praxisorientierte Konzepte, 
Effektive Instrumente, Verlag Moderne Industrie, Landsberg/Lech. 
Dralle, J. (2006), BBDO und AutoScout24 erheben Markenbindingspotential, 
Automobilwoche online, June 04, 2006. 
Dudenhoeffer, F. (2006), Das Phaenomen vom Verlust der Mitte, Proceedings of 6. 
International Car-Symposium, Gelsenkirchen. 
Gentzkow, M. (2005), Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online 
Newspapers, Mimeo, University of Chicago. 
Goldberg, P. K (1995), Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: the 
Case of U.S. Automobile Industry, Econometrica, 63(4), 891-951. 
Goldberg, P. K. and F. Verboven (2001), The Evolution of the Price Dispersion in the 
European Car Market, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68, 811-848. 
Goolsbee, A. and A. Petrin (2002), The Consumer Gains from Direct Broadcast Satellites and 
the Competition from Cable Television, NBER Working Paper No 8317. 
Griliches, Z. (1961), Hedonic Price Indexes for Automobiles: An Econometric Analysis of 
Quality Change, NBER Staff Report No. 3, General Series, No. 73, New York. 
Fershtman, C. and N. Gandal (1998), The Effect of the Arab Boykott on Israel: the 
Automobile Market, RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 193-214. 
Hausman, J. A. and D. McFadden (1984), Specification Tests for the Multinominal Logit 
Model, Econometrica, 52 (5). 
Hausman, J. A. (1994), Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition, 
NBER Working Paper No 4970. 
Hausman, J. A (1996), Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition, in: 
Bresnahan, T. F. and R. J. Gordon (Eds.), The Economics of New Goods, Studies in Income 
and Wealth, Vol. 58, Chicago: NBER. 
Hausman, J. A. (1997), Cellular Telephone, New Products and the CPI, NBER Working 
Paper No 5982. 
Hausman, J. A., A. Pakes and G. L. Rosston (1997), Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New 
Services in Telecommunications, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 
Vol. 1997 (1997), 1-54. 
 36
Hausman, J. A. and G. K. Leonard (2002), The Competitive Effects of a New Product 
Introduction: a Case Study, Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume L, September 2002, No 
3, 237-263. 
Jaumandreu, J. and M. J. Moral (2006), Identifying Behaviour in a Multiproduct Oligopoly: 
Incumbents Reaction to Tariffs Dismantling, Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper 
No 1248. 
Kaiser, U. and W. Sofka (2006), The Pulse of Liability of Foreignness: Dynamic Legitimacy 
and Experience Effects in the German Car Market,  ZEW Discussion Paper No 06-070. 
Leheyda, N. (2007), Market Power, Multimarket Contact and Pricing: Some Evidence from 
the US Automobile Market, Mimeo, University of Mannheim. 
Mariuzzo, F. (2005), The Effect of Differences in Buyer and Non-Buyer Characteristics on 
Equilibrium Price-Elasticities: An Empirical Study on the Italian Automobile Market, Trinity 
Economic Papers 2005/13, Trinity College of Dublin, Ireland.   
McFadden, D. (1978), Modelling the Choice of Residential Allocation, in: Karlqvist, A., L. 
Lundqvist, F. Snickars and J. W. Weibull (Eds.), Spatial Interaction Theory and Planning 
Methods, in: Series Andersson, A. and W. Isard (Eds.), Studies in Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, Vol. 3, North-Holland Publishing Company. 
McKinsey Global Institute (2005), Increasing Global Competition and Labour Productivity: 
Lessons from the US Automotive Industry, November, 2005, McKinsey&Company. 
Nevo, A. (2000), A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models 
of Demand, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(4), 513-548. 
Nevo, A. (2001), Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 
Econometrica, 69(2), 307-342. 
Ohta, M. and Z. Griliches (1983), Automobile Prices and Quality: Did the Gasoline Price 
Increase Change Consumer Tastes in the US?, NBER Working Paper No 1211. 
Pakes, A., S. Berry and James A. Levinsohn (1993), Applications and Limitations of Some 
Recent Advances in Empirical Industrial Organization: Price Indexes and the Analysis of 
Environmental Change, American Economic Review, 83(2), Papers and Proceedings of the 
Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 240-246. 
Pakes, A. (2002), A Reconsideration of Hedonic Price Indices with an Application to PC’s, 
NBER Working Paper No 8715.  
Pakes, A. (2004), Course on Graduate Industrial Organization, Bronnbach Summer School, 
Summer 2005. 
Petrin, A. (2002), Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: the Case of the Minivan, 
Journal of Political Economy, 110(4). 
Schmalensee, R, (1978), Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, Bell 
Journal of Economics, 9, 305-327. 
Shapiro, C. (1982), Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation, Bell 
Journal of Economics, 13(1), 20-35. 
Spence, A. M. (1976), Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, 217-235. 
Sofka, W. and J. Zimmermann (2005), There’s no Place Like Home: Estimating the Degree of 
Liability of Foreignness in the German Car Market, ZEW Discussion Paper No 05-53, 
Mannheim. 
 37
Stern, S. (1996), Market Definition and the Returns to Innovation: Substitution Patterns in 
Pharmaceutical Markets, Mimeo, MIT Sloan School and NBER. 
Stern (2006), Die PKW Branche in Markenprofile 11. 
Thomas, L. and K. Weigelt (2000), Product Location Choice and Firm Capabilities: Evidence 
from the U.S. Automobile Industry, Strategic Management Journal, 21(9), 897-909. 
Trajtenberg, M. (1989), The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to 
Computed Tomography Scanners, Journal of Political Economy, 97(2), 444-479. 
Trajtenberg, M. (1990), The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovation: The Case of CT 
Scanners, Harvard Economic Studies, Volume 160, Harvard University Press. 
Verboven, F. (1996), International Price Discrimination in the European Car Market, RAND 
Journal of Economics, 27(2), 240-268. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1988), Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example 
of Signalling by Posting a Bond, RAND Journal of Economics, 19(3), 458-466. 
 
 
